Agreed, the Gadgets platform is no more or less vulnerable than if the user executed an unsigned application.
Why the same warning of execution at the system level, heuristic analysis and other methods applied to applications cannot be applied to gadgets, it mystifies me.
This is by no means an embarrassment on the part of Microsoft: the Gadgets platform has not been highly appreciated or widely used (despite the potential for an unprecedented level of capabilities and the integration of web functions directly on the desktop), so instead of making any attempts to protect the user from malicious gadgets, they simply stopped them.
With the direction of user interfaces in Windows, Mac and Android, the average user is becoming less and less aware of how the application (or plug-in) actually does what it does, so the proliferation of unnecessary, opportunistic or even malicious applications continues. I was back and forth in the Gadgets specification, and as far as I can tell, it is no more secure than the plugin system used by Chrome and FireFox.
Running ActiveX and Java on the gadget is subject to the security settings in Internet Explorer. If your security settings allow the gadget to do something, most of these functions can be used in a plugin or Java application.
Analyst reports that I read indicate that these vulnerabilities have been fixed in "the most modern browsers", but this is clearly not true for Internet Explorer, since every gadget that I see can also be launched in IE browser.
In short, this is the “switch style switch” for ActiveX, Java, and the other plugins that are to blame here. Trying to save the user from endless requests and eliminate the requirement of making an informed decision, Microsoft continues to leave uninformed or reckless users open to malicious web applications and plugins.
Trust certificates and security patches would be much preferable to terminating the function.