I assume that you are talking about this certificate from UTN-USERFirst-Hardware:
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEdDCCA1ygAwIBAgIQRL4Mi1AAJLQR0zYq/mUK/TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCB lzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxCzAJBgNVBAgTAlVUMRcwFQYDVQQHEw5TYWx0IExha2Ug Q2l0eTEeMBwGA1UEChMVVGhlIFVTRVJUUlVTVCBOZXR3b3JrMSEwHwYDVQQLExho dHRwOi8vd3d3LnVzZXJ0cnVzdC5jb20xHzAdBgNVBAMTFlVUTi1VU0VSRmlyc3Qt SGFyZHdhcmUwHhcNOTkwNzA5MTgxMDQyWhcNMTkwNzA5MTgxOTIyWjCBlzELMAkG A1UEBhMCVVMxCzAJBgNVBAgTAlVUMRcwFQYDVQQHEw5TYWx0IExha2UgQ2l0eTEe MBwGA1UEChMVVGhlIFVTRVJUUlVTVCBOZXR3b3JrMSEwHwYDVQQLExhodHRwOi8v d3d3LnVzZXJ0cnVzdC5jb20xHzAdBgNVBAMTFlVUTi1VU0VSRmlyc3QtSGFyZHdh cmUwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCx98M4P7Sof885glFn 0G2f0v9Y8+efK+wNiVSZuTiZFvfgIXlIwrthdBKWHTxqctU8EGc6Oe0rE81m65UJ M6Rsl7HoxuzBdXmcRl6Nq9Bq/bkqVRcQVLMZ8Jr28bFdtqdt++BxF2uiiPsA3/4a MXcMmgF6sTLjKwEHOG7DpV4jvEWbe1DByTCP2+UretNb+zNAHqDVmBe8i4fDidNd oI6yqqr2jmmIBsX6iSHzCJ1pLgkzmykNRg+MzEk0sGlRvfkGzWitZky8PqxhvQqI DsjfPe58BEydCl5rkdbux+0ojatNh4lz0G6k0B4WixThdkQDf2Os5M1JnMWS9Ksy oUhbAgMBAAGjgbkwgbYwCwYDVR0PBAQDAgHGMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wHQYD VR0OBBYEFKFyXyYbKJhDlV0HN9WFlp1L0sNFMEQGA1UdHwQ9MDswOaA3oDWGM2h0 dHA6Ly9jcmwudXNlcnRydXN0LmNvbS9VVE4tVVNFUkZpcnN0LUhhcmR3YXJlLmNy bDAxBgNVHSUEKjAoBggrBgEFBQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAwUGCCsGAQUFBwMGBggrBgEF BQcDBzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEARxkP3nTGmZev/K0oXnWO6y1n7k57K9cM //bey1WiCuFMVGWTYGufEpytXoMs61quwOQt9ABjHbjAbPLPSbtNk28Gpgoiskli CE7/yMgUsogWXecB5BKV5UU0s4tpvc+0hY91UZ59Ojg6FEgSxvunOxqNDYJAB+gE CJChicsZUN/KHAG8HQQZexB2lzvukJDKxA4fFm517zP4029bHpbj4HR3dHuKom4t 3XbWOTCC8KucUvIqx69JXn7HaOWCgchqJ/kniCrVWFCVH/A7HFe7fRQ5YiuayZSS KqMiDP+JJn1fIytH1xUdqWqeUQ0qUZ6B+dQ7XnASfxAynB67nfhmqA== -----END CERTIFICATE-----
In a readable version:
Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 44:be:0c:8b:50:00:24:b4:11:d3:36:2a:fe:65:0a:fd Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN-USERFirst-Hardware Validity Not Before: Jul 9 18:10:42 1999 GMT Not After : Jul 9 18:19:22 2019 GMT Subject: C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN-USERFirst-Hardware Subject Public Key Info: [...] X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:TRUE X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: A1:72:5F:26:1B:28:98:43:95:5D:07:37:D5:85:96:9D:4B:D2:C3:45 X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://crl.usertrust.com/UTN-USERFirst-Hardware.crl X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, IPSec End System, IPSec Tunnel, IPSec User
Essentially, we have a CA certificate with the X509v3 Key Usage
and X509v3 Extended Key Usage
.
However, RFC 3280 says the following about extending an extension of an extended key :
In the general case, this extension will be displayed only in the final certificate object.
This does not work well for a CA certificate, but later in the same section the following is said:
If the certificate contains both a key usage extension and an extended key use extension, then both extensions MUST be processed independently, and the certificate MUST be used only for the purpose of both extensions. If there is no purpose with both extensions, then the certificate SHOULD NOT be used for any purpose.
The only extended key usage extension in this certificate, which is in this RFC, is TLS web server authentication:
id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } -- TLS WWW server authentication -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature, -- keyEncipherment or keyAgreement
Of course, this is not consistent with keyCertSign
, which is according to RFC 3280 (and RFC 5280). (I also doubt that any IPSec extensions are compatible with keyCertSign
). This makes this certificate useless for issuing certificates (not very useful for a CA certificate).
I would like to contact the website using this certificate to ask them to contact their CA (UTN-USERFirst-Hardware, apparently Comodo) and ask them to fix it. I must say that this does not look good based on people who make their money on the back of these RFCs.
Of course, this may take some time and will not solve your immediate problem.
I think I saw this subject DN (UTN-USERFirst-Hardware) in other CA intermediate certificates, so one of them might not be the one you are using.
What you could do (provided that you yourself can verify the server certificate manually, despite these problems) is to use SSLContext
and TrustManager
, specially limited to use this certificate itself, for this connection. This can prevent the certification path algorithm from trying to find the issuer certificate and get into this problem.
EDIT:
Here is more detailed information about this workaround (which should still keep your connection safe).
- Connect to Firefox on this website.
- Click on the blue / green bar and select "More information ..."
- Security → View Certificate → Details
- Select a server certificate from the list above and select "Export ..."
- Same thing in the PEM file.
Use keytool
to create a new keystore (select to trust this certificate and choose a reasonable password):
keytool -importcert -keystore example.jks -file example.pem
Then use this Java code, which should not be too complicated to port to Groovy:
TrustManagerFactory tmf = TrustManagerFactory .getInstance(TrustManagerFactory.getDefaultAlgorithm()); KeyStore ks = KeyStore.getInstance("JKS"); FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream("/.../example.jks"); ks.load(fis, null); // or ks.load(fis, "thepassword".toCharArray()); fis.close(); tmf.init(ks); SSLContext sslContext = SSLContext.getInstance("TLS"); sslContext.init(null, tmf.getTrustManagers(), null); URL url = new URL("https://somewebsite.com"); HttpsURLConnection conn = (HttpsURLConnection) url.openConnection(); conn.setSSLSocketFactory(sslContext.getSocketFactory()); InputStream is = conn.getInputStream();